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RECENT DECISIONS
PROCEDURE - LABOR LAW - REMOVAL OF § 301 (A) SUIT DENIED WHEN
PLAINTIFF SEEKS INJUNCTION. - On October 31, 1963, four hundred em-
ployees, members of Local 25, Marine Division International Union of Op-
erating Engineers, AFL-CIO, ceased work for plaintiff, American Dredging
Company. Two collective bargaining agreements, requiring binding arbitration
of all disputes and prohibiting all strikes and other suspensions of work, were
in effect between Local 25 and plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin Local
25 from striking in violation of its agreement. In an ex parte hearing, the
Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, granted the re-
quested preliminary injunction against Local 25 and its officers. The defendant,
Local 25, removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania which denied plaintiff's motion to remand to the state
court. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in
the district court to bring the issue of removal within the scope of a reviewable
order.' This motion was also denied.' Vacating this judgment and remanding
the case to the district court with instructions to remand to the state court, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Court held: notwithstanding the grant
of jurisdiction to any district court of the United States to hear suits for the vio-
lation of contracts between employers and labor organizations by § 301(a) of
the Taft-Hartley Act,' § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act4 denies such courts the
"original jurisdiction" required by § 1441 of the Removal Acte to sustain a
1 An order remanding a case to the state court from which it was removed cannot be ap-
pealed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1958). However, removability is jurisdictional and can be con-
sidered together with an appealable order. Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp. 184 F.2d 537 (3d
Cir. 1950). The denial of a temporary injunction is such an order. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
(1958).
2 American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Div., Int. Union of Operating Eng'rs.,
224 F. Supp. 985 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
3 Section 301"(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act),
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958), provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
4 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958),
provides in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in
such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment...
5 Section 1441 of the Removal Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958), provides in part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court
of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the
United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the
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motion to remove a suit to a United States district court when an injunction to
enforce the "no-strike" provision of a collective bargaining agreement is sought.
American Dredging Co. v. Local 25, Marine Division, International Union of
Operating Engineers, 338 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 935
(1965).
Though the problem in American Dredging arises from the interplay of
three federal statutes, its true genesis is found in the Supreme Court's treatment
of § 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act. When this legislation was passed, the
predominant concern of Congress was to make labor organizations subject to
suit in federal courts,' since they could not be sued effectively in some state
courts.' Underlying this purpose was an important policy consideration: unions
as well as employers must be held legally accountable for breaching collective
bargaining agreements in order to promote the mutual responsibility necessary
for industrial peace.'
From this apparently simple grant of federal jurisdiction, the United States
Supreme Court has developed § 301(a) into the cornerstone of a rapidly
expanding federal labor law applicable to collective bargaining agreements.
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,9 the Supreme
Court held that, under § 301(a), the federal courts are to fashion a body of
substantive labor law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.
The Court also observed that "the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes
is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike."'1 Subsequently, in declaring
that the "present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through
the collective bargaining agreement," '1 1 the Court emphasized the desirability
of including "no-strike" provisions in such agreements.' The full import of
Lincoln Mills became more apparent in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour
Co.,' holding that substantive principles of federal labor law are controlling
in state courts entertaining suits covered by § 301 (a). Extending the quid pro
parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.
6 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947); "It is apparent that until all
jurisdictions, and particularly the Federal Government, authorize actions against labor unions
as legal entities, there will not be the mutual responsibility necessary to vitalize collective-
bargaining agreements."
7 At common law, labor uflions could not sue or be sued as separate entities. Many
courts required that process be served individually upon each member and held that court
decrees did not bind union members not present. E.g., Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders
Union, 150 Fed. 155 '(E.D. Wis. 1906); St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 94
Minn. 351, 102 N.W. 725 (1905); Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306 (1902);
S. REP. No. 105, supra note 6, at 15-18.
8 S. REp. No. 105, supra note 6, at 16: "Consequently, to encourage the making of agree-
ments and to promote industrial peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective
agreements affecting interstate commerce should be enforceable in the Federal courts."
9 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
10 Id. at 455.
11 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). Accord,
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). In all three of
these decisions, the Supreme Court compelled the defendants to submit unresolved grievances
to arbitration as provided for in collective bargaining contracts.
12 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 11, at 578 n.4. See Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957).
13 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
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quo doctrine of Lincoln Mills, the court concluded that any agreement con-
taining a provision for compulsory arbitration of disputes implicitly contained
a promise by the union not to strike.
The possibility that the Court would ultimately determine that, under §
301 (a), state courts were pre-empted from even entertaining suits for breaches
of collective bargaining agreements was unequivocally dispelled in Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney.14 Noting that the purpose of § 301 (a) was to
increase, not to limit, the availability of forums for the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements, the Supreme Court reasoned that although federal
substantive law must be applied for all such suits, state courts exercise concur-
rent jurisdiction with federal courts."
The scope of this federal substantive law was left very uncertain by Sinclair
Refining Co. v. Atkinson. 6 There, the Supreme Court ruled that § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act had not been impliedly repealed by § 301 (a); and, there-
fore, federal courts could not grant injunctions to enforce "no-strike" clauses
in collective bargaining agreements. As a result of this much criticized decision,"
the issue adjudicated in American Dredging is of utmost significance to the
evolving federal law relating to the enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments. Sinclair's holding applied only to federal courts." Prior to this decision,
the authority of state courts to grant injunctive relief in a suit for violation of
a "no-strike" clause was clear. 9 And, despite arguments to the contrary,20
post-Sinclair cases affirm the right to such relief in state courts.2 ' In American
Dredging, therefore, allowing removal would have necessarily prevented the
plaintiff from obtaining the permanent injunction available in the state court.22
The argument against permitting removal and in favor of remanding to
the state court is a persuasive one.2 Emphasizing that state courts have con-
14 368 U.S. 502 '(1962).
15 This decision left unanswered the question of exactly what federal substantive law
includes.
16 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
17 E.g., Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292, 342-43
(1963); Kovarsky, Unfair Labor Practices, Individual Rights and Section 301, 16 VAND. L.
REv. 595, 606-09 (1963); Note, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 423, 424-25 (1964). But see Wellington
and Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v.
Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, (1963).
18 "For these reasons, the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprives the courts of the United States ofjurisdiction to enter that injunction . . ." 370 U.S. at 203. (Emphasis added.)
19 United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of America v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 65 F.
Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1946); McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters,
49 Cal.2d 45, 315 P.2d 322, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958); Philadelphia Marine Trade
Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733, cert. denied, 350
U.S. 843 (1955); General Bldg. Contractors' Ass'n v. Local Union No. 542, 370 Pa. 73, 87
A.2d 250 (1952).
20 See Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 COLUM. L. REv. 1027, 1037 (1963).
21 Radio Corp. of America v. Local 780, International Alliance of Theatrical Stage En-
ployees, 160 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964), cert. denied, 169 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1965); C.D.
Perry & Sons, Inc. v. Robilotto, 39 Misc.2d 147, 240 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Shaw
Elec. Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 208 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1965).
22 The temporary injunction was granted on November 1, 1963. Hearing on plaintiff's
motion to continue the injunction was set for November 6th; however, defendant removed the
case on November 4th.
23 In Dowd Box, 368 U.S. 502, 514 n.8 (1962), the United States Supreme Court noted
the existence of the removal problem presented in American Dredging without suggesting a
solution. No other court of appeals has adjudicated the question, but the majority of district
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current jurisdiction in § 301 suits, the plaintiff is said to have a choice as to
which remedial law- state or federal- he wishes to rely upon.2  Since, on
a motion to remove, the complaint is determinative, if it does not present a
federal question, removal must be denied.25 Recognizing that under § 301 (a),
federal substantive law must be applied, the "federal question" requirement is
narrowly interpreted to mean that the complaint must allege a dispute whose
resolution depends upon the validity or construction of § 301 (a).26
The main thrust of the argument against removal concentrates on the
meaning of "jurisdiction" as that term is embodied in § 301 (a) of the Taft-
Hartley Act, § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and § 1441 of the Removal
Act.27 A majority of courts considering the problem have concluded that when
the plaintiff seeks an injunction barred by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, they lack
the "original jurisdiction" required by the Removal Act. 8 The rationale for this
conclusion is that "jurisdiction" includes not only the power to take cognizance
of the case (which § 301 (a) apparently grants), but also the power to grant
relief according to the merits of the plaintiff's cause.29 And, when an injunc-
tion is sought, federal courts are powerless to grant such relief under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act. Thus, "the denial of jurisdiction . . . over certain types of
injunctive relief would preclude ... taking cognizance of the action."2 " If this
sylogistic array does not demonstrate that the federal courts lack "original juris-
courts are in accord with American Dredging. E.g., Merchant's Refrigerating Co. of Calif. v.
Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Calif. 1963); Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse
Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959) *(remanded suit for injunction, retaining jurisdiction
over damage claim); Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, Int'l Longshoremen's Union,
110 F. Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953). See 1A MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 0.167, at
1001-10 (1965). Contra, Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 229 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa.
1964) (in Third Circuit prior to American Dredging); Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers
Union, 228 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. N.Y. 1963); Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc. 98 F.
Supp. 278 (S.D. N.Y. 1951).
24 See Associated Tel. Co. v. -Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334, 337 (S.D. Calif.
1953); Hat Corp. of America v. United Hatters, 114 F. Supp. 890, 892 (D. Conn. 1953);
IA MOORE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1010 and cases cited therein.
25 Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court 366 U.S. 656, 663 (1960); Castle &
Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, supra note 23, at 249; Merchant's Refrigerating Co. of Calif. v.
Warehouse Union, 213 F. Supp. 177 (N.D. Calif. 1963). See IA MoORE, op. cit. supra note
23, at 1002 and cases cited therein. At 472-73, Professor Moore comments as follows:
In an action invoking the original jurisdiction of the district court on the basis
that the action is one "arising under," the federal ground must appear in the com-
plaint well pleaded. This same principle normally applies to removal since it is keyed
to original jurisdiction; and there can be no removal on the basis of a federal
question presented for the first time in defendant's petition for removal or in his
answer.
26 See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 115 (1936); Shulthis v.
McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912); Gold-washing and Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199,
203-04 (1877).
27 In American Dredging, however, the Court of Appeals appears to give equal weight to
the assertion that the lack of a "federal question" is alone sufficient to deny removal without a
consideration of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 338 F.2d at 843-46.
28 Cases cited note 23 supra. Most of the district courts holding that removal must be
denied when the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief but not when he seeks some additional
remedy, have accepted this reasoning. See text accompanying notes 55-60 infra.
29 General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 271 U.S. 228 (1926).
30 National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Heffernan, 195 F. Supp. 153, 155 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). In
this case, the plaintiff sought money damages and an injunction. Remand was denied, and
the prayer for damages was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court accepted the theory
that it lacked jurisdiction over suits for injunctions only.
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diction," at least the existence of such jurisdiction is in doubt, and therefore,
the case still must be remanded.3
The argument against removal is reinforced by the policy considerations
underpinning § 301(a), which was enacted to facilitate the enforcement of
labor-management agreements. 2 Such agreements best promote industrial peace
when they prohibit strikes and provide for the compulsory arbitration of all
disputes."3 When § 301 (a) was passed, Congress considered amending the Nor-
ris-LaGuardia Act to allow federal courts to issue injunctions enforcing collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 4 Instead, Congress chose to continue having them
enforced through the "usual processes of the law,"35 which included, among other
remedies, state court injunctions. 6 Thus, to allow removal would effectively
divest state courts of a power impliedly reserved to them by Congress and give
the opposite effect to legislation intended to enhance union responsibility.
The last argument offered against removal appeals to the courts' sense of
justice. Pointing out that an injunction is the only meaningful remedy to cor-
rect an obvious wrong suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the defendant's
breach,"7 attention is drawn to the Supreme Court's ruling that a union's prom-
ise not to strike is the quid pro quo of an employer's promise to submit all
disputes to arbitration." Since the latter is specifically enforceable against the
employer,39 it is anamolous to refuse to enforce the former.4" Moreover, it is
incongruous "to hold, on one hand, that a District Court has original jurisdic-
tion sufficient to grant the removal of a cause and then to hold, on the other,
that the cause, once removed, must be dismissed by the District Court for the
reason that it lacks jurisdiction of the cause and consequently has no power to
grant the relief sought."'"
The argument in favor of removal is also a strong one. Under the prin-
ciples enunciated in Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour, a suit for the enforcement
of a "no-strike" provision in a collective bargaining agreement is necessarily
31 Patriot-News Co. v. Harrisburg Printing Pressmen, 191 F. Supp. 568 (M.D. Pa. 1961);
Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 177 F. Supp. 511 (D. Colo. 1959).
32 See note 8, supra.
33 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
34 93 CONG. REc. 4887-5076, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
35 Ibid. This phrase was defined by the Second Circuit as apparently meaning "processes
in force when the Att was passed." A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d
326, 332 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
36 At the time of the passage of § 301 (a) "state court injunctions formed an important
element of the 'usual processes of law.'" Isaacson, The Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration
and the No-Strike Clause, 48 A.B.A.J. 914, 920 (1962). For a discussion of the types of relief
then available in state courts, see S. REP. No. 105, supra note 6, at 15-18 and H. R. REP'.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 108-09 (1947).
37 Strikes of any significant duration are likely to cause irreparable harm to employers.
An award of damages can hardly compensate for loss of goodwill, nor can it return customers
who have turned to competitors with more reliable production schedules.
38 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See discussion in
Stewart, No-Strike Clauses in the Federal Courts, 59 Mica. L. REv. 673 (1961).
39 Cases cited notes 9 and 11 supra.
40 The contention has been made that to deny employers the right to enjoin violations
completely destroys the quid pro quo doctrine enunciated in Lincoln Mills. See discussion in
Comment, Quid Pro Quo in Federal Labor Law: Enforcement of the No-Strike Clause, 1963
Wis. L. REv. 626 '(1963).
41 Walker v. United Mine Workers of America, 105 F. Supp. 608, 611 '(W.D. Pa. 1952).
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one brought under federal law. 2 Since federal courts have taken cognizance
of federal questions which were necessarily present in a case, though not ap-
parent in the complaint, 3 and since the real nature of the claim asserted is
federal, removal must be allowed.44
The "jurisdictional" bar of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is confronted by
contending that to read § 4 as denying federal courts the right to entertain a
suit to enjoin a strike in violation of a bargaining agreement fails to distinguish
between jurisdiction and power to grant the relief desired.45 Accepting the
assertion that "jurisdiction" means more than mere authority to take cognizance
of a suit, however, even if relief other than an injunction is not prayed for, a
district court has power to provide the plaintiff with appropriate legal remedies
after a hearing on the merits."8 Federal courts do, therefore, have the full juris-
diction insisted upon as essential to the existence of original jurisdiction under
the Removal Act.-"
The policy arguments employed by those favoring removal are derived,
not so much from the legislative history of § 301 (a), as from its subsequent
construction by the Supreme Court. As recognized in recent decisions, § 301 (a)
charged federal courts with the responsibility of developing a single, consistent
body of federal labor law.4 Since injunctive relief is denied litigants in federal
courts, it should necessarily be unavailable in any suit for violation of a col-
lective bargaining agreement. 9 At the time of the congressional debates over
§ 301 (a), both the House and the Senate considered and rejected amendments
designed to exempt § 301 suits from Norris-LaGuardia's ban on injunctions."
Consequently, removal implements federal policy calling for a uniform labor
42 Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 229 F. Supp. 123, 127 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Fay v.
American Cystoscope, 98 F. Supp. 278, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Isaacson, supra note 36.
43 1A MooRE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1002 and cases cited therein. In Pocahontas
Terminal Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 93 F. Supp. 217, 219, 225 (D.
Me. 1950), the court stated:
[It] takes judicial notice of any Federal laws necessarily brought into play by
the allegations of the complaint; and it is immaterial that specific reference to such
laws may be omitted in the pleading .... The test of removal to a Federal court is
not what the court must ultimately do with the case under Federal law but whether
the Federal law applies to and controls the case by its provisions, as brought into
operation by the complaint.
44 See cases cited note 23 supra.
45 American Dredging v. Local 25, 224 F.Supp. 985, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (district court
opinion). See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 229 F.Supp. 123, 127 (..D. Pa. 1964);
Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union, 228 F.Supp. 720, 724 n. 10 (E.D. N.Y. 1963).
CHAFEE, SOM3E PROBLEMS OF EQuriY, 368-74 (1950) (extensive discussion of this distinction).
46 See American Dredging v. Local 25, 224 F.Supp. 985, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (district
court opinion). FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c) provides that district courts have the power to grant
any relief that they deem proper, whether or not the appropriate remedy is specifically prayed
for. However, as the Third Circuit notes in American Dredging, 338 F.2d 837, 848 (3d Cir.
1964), FED. R. Civ. P. 82 states: "These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit thejurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein."
47 Cases cited note 23 supra.
48 E.g., Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Local 174, Teamsters
v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); United Steelworkers cases, supra note 11; Textile
Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
49 American Dredging, 338 F.2d 837, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1964) '(dissenting opinion); Phil-
adelphia Marine Trade Ass'n. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n. supra note 19 at 741
(dissenting opinion); Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered
Questions, 63 COLUm. L. REv. 1027, 1035-37 (1963).
50 See note 34 supra.
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law formulated by federal courts, while remand allows state courts to determine
much of the law governing labor agreements.
Contentions that the plaintiff would suffer an injustice if removal were
allowed are disposed of in light of the above policy considerations. After removal
of a suit for an injunction to enforce a "no-strike" clause, a federal court need
not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. 1 It may grant specific performance
of an arbitration provision,52 declaratory relief,5" or money damages. 4 The
employer's promise to submit disputes to arbitration and the union's promise
not to strike are both enforceable, but national labor policy forbids specific per-
formance of a "no-strike" clause by way of injunction.
In American Dredging, the plaintiff sought only injunctive relief, 5 but its
general prayer also requested "such other relief as the Court may deem appro-
priate."5 6 Since suits to compel arbitration, for damages, or for declaratory relief
are within the jurisdiction conferred upon District Courts by § 301 (a), some
courts have held that when a suit for an injunction also contains a prayer for
damages, removal is permissible. 7 In American Dredging, however, the court
accepted the plaintiff's argument that the request for "other appropriate relief"
was surplusage." Since the court is required to grant any relief it deems proper
and just, all prayers for injunctions impliedly include requests for any other avail-
able remedies. Thus, when the plaintiff is obviously seeking an injunction,
adding a prayer for some other specific relief should not affect a denial of
removal.6"
The ramifications of the holding in American Dredging are most significant.
First, it will inevitably lead to state courts becoming the preferred forum for
adjudicating breaches of "no-strike" clauses in collective bargaining agreements.
51 See Di Giovanni v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n., 296 U.S. 64, 69 (1935); Aaron, supra
note 49, at 1045-46. But see note 46 supra.
52 E.g., United Steelworkers cases, supra note 11.
53 E.g., Allied Oil Workers v. Ethyl Corp., 341 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1965).
54 E.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
55 The strongest evidence for this conclusion is the fact that plaintiff brought two separate
actions for damages in the district court. Brief for Appellant, p. 10.
56 Id. at 3.
57 The reasoning as to the significance of the addition of a prayer for damages is confusing
as well as inconsistent. H. A. Lott, Inc. v. Hoisting & Portable Eng'rs. Local No. 450, 222
F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex. 1963) held that the inclusion of the damage prayer confers the necess-
ary jurisdiction on the district court to sustain removal, and that removal could also be based
upon § 1441 (c) of the Removal Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) '(1958). This provision authorizes
the removal of "separate and independent" claims that are not removable when sued upon
alone, if such a cause of action is joined with an otherwise removable one. But cf. American
Fire & Cas. -Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). Contra, Crestwood Dairy, Inc. v. Kelley, 222 F.
Supp. 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Associated Tel. Co. v. Communication Workers, 114 F. Supp. 334
(S.D. Calif. 1953).
58 American Dredging, 338 F.2d 837, 849 (3d Cir. 1964).
59 This conclusion is drawn from Rule 54(c), supra note 46, which reads in part: "Except
as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has
not demanded such relief in his pleadings."
60 IA MOORE, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1003-04: "The presence of a prayer for damages
should not alter the result. If the federal court lacks jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief
there should be no removal, for no statute authorizes a single cause of action to be split for
removal purposes." See Aaron, supra note 49, at 1046 n.128. For a discussion of the inappli-
cability of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, see Comment, Statutory and Contractual Re-
strictions on the Right to Strike During the Term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70
YALE L.J. 1366, 1402 n.246 (1961). A full consideration of the problem posed by the ad-
dition of a prayer for damages with one for an injunction is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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The employer's primary desire is that work continue for the duration of the
contract period.6 If American Dredging is followed, he can achieve this, but
only in state courts, and only at the cost of undermining the Supreme Court's
declaration that our national labor policy requires the formulation of a uniform
labor law by federal courts. 2 Second, if it is true that injunctive relief is such
a unique remedy that it constitutes a substantive right in itself, ' because of the
existence of anti-injunction statutes in some states and not in others, 4 not only
is it possible that state courts will be determining much labor law relative to
collective bargaining agreements, but also some parties to such agreements will
have substantive rights denied to others because of their particular place of
residence. 5
Though the consequences of the rule adopted in American Dredging are
unpleasant, it is submitted that the alternative is even less desirable. Allowing
removal will certainly aid in the development of uniformity in our law govern-
ing collective bargaining agreements. However, in eliminating the strongest
deterrent to the type of contract-breaking strike engaged in by the defendant
in American Dredging, removal also encumbers that aspect of our national labor
policy that has been increasingly fostering industrial peace as a paramount
public interest.6 Enhancing the responsibility of labor unions was merely the
means by which Congress, in enacting § 301 (a), hoped to further this interest.6
Thus, the most serious objection to removal is not that it divests state courts
of their heretofore recognized right to enjoin strikes in breach of collective
bargaining agreements," nor that it deprives employers of the only meaningful
relief from such breaches," but that removal impedes the promotion of indus-
trial peace.
This removal problem may become moot if the view expressed in Ruppert
v. Egelhofer"° becomes generally accepted. This pre-Sinclair decision held that
when a collective bargaining agreement confers authority upon an arbitrator
to halt a strike in violation of a "no-strike" provision, an employer can obtain
judicial enforcement of the arbitrator's order, even though an anti-injunction
statute prohibits the court from enjoining the strike directly.7 The reasons for
61 See notes 37, 38 supra and accompanying text.
62 See cases cited note 48 supra.
63 Aaron, supra note 49, at 1034-37. But see Isaacson, supra note 36, 920, suggesting that
the uniformity called for is in the interpretation of the meaning of collective bargaining agree-
ments rather than in the remedies available for their enforcement. If this view is correct, the
nature of injunctive relief would seem to be immaterial.
64 Approximately one-half of the states have some type of anti-injunction legislation.
1CCH LAB. L. RaP., (state law) 40, 355 (1964). Not all of these statutes, however, bar the
issuance of injunctions to enforce collective bargaining agreements. E.g., 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §
206(d) (1964).
65 But cf. cases cited note 48 supra.
66 'See S. REP. No. 105, 80th 'Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947); Leedom, New Horizons in Labor-
Management Relations, 11 LAB. L. J. 11 (1960).
67 See S. Rp. No. 105, supra note 66.
68 See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
69 See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
70 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
71 The New York Court of Appeals found the existence of such authority without any
express references to it in the bargaining agreement, candidly admitting that such authority
was being inferred from the general terms of the agreement. 3 N.Y.2d at 578; 148 N.E.2d at
130; 170 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
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allowing such relief are compelling. There is an obvious labor policy strongly
supporting an effective arbitration process. 2 Moreover, judicial enforcement
of the arbitrator's order would enable both federal and state courts to deny
injunctions for violations of "no-strike" provisions and to temper the injustice
of such refusals by allowing the parties to contractually empower an arbitrator
to issue such orders.73 Unlike a court injunction, the enforcement of such an
order would not be the type of governmental coercion which prompted the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,"' but would be the
ratification of a mutual grant of authority by parties to a contract. Thus, if
this theory, which presents no obstacle to removal,"5 is accepted, "no-strike"
clauses can be uniformly enforced by a process which complies with the letter
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and § 301 (a) and which supports the policies
underlying both."6
If the reasoning in Ruppert is eventually discredited, and if Congress does
not provide a legislative solution,77 the courts will continue to be confronted
with attempts to remove suits for injunctions against strikes in breach of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. At the core of this controversy looms the larger
question of whether employers should ever have the right to injunctive relief
to compel labor unions to adhere to the terms of "no-strike" clauses in collec-
tive bargaining agreements. This question cannot be answered until a funda-
mental policy decision is made: is the interest in establishing a centrally ad-
ministered, uniform labor law to prevail over the attainment of industrial peace
through effective collective bargaining agreements that are equally enforceable
72 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers of
America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
73 For a discussion of Ruppert v. Egelhoffer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d
785 (1958), and reasons why its principles should be followed by the federal courts, see Note,
39 INin. L. J. 387, 392-94 (1964).
74 See Givens, Section 301, Arbitration and the No-Strike Clause, 11 LAB. L. J. 1005,
1014-15 (1960) (argues for the Ruppert approach).
75 Since the district court would be regarded as having the jurisdiction to specifically
enforce an arbitrator's order to halt a strike, it would follow that the District Court would
have the requisite original jurisdiction to enable the suit to be removed from a state court.
76 Considering that over 90 percent of all collective bargaining agreements contain some
explicit restrictions on the right to strike, Note, Statutory & Contractual Restrictions on the
Right to Strike During the Term of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 70 YALE L. J. 1366,
1374, it is surprising that those who negotiate these agreements have not taken greater advan-
tage of the Ruppert precedent by expressly empowering arbitrators to halt a strike in violation of
contract. One district court has followed the same reasoning as that employed in Ruppert:
New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers, 49 L.R.R.M. 2941 44 L.C. 1 17575
(E.D. La. 1962). Although this decision was also pre-Sinclair, federal courts tend to liberally
construe arbitration agreements and the scope of an arbitrator's authority. See cases cited
note 72 supra. For an indication that Ruppert may be followed in at least one other state, see
Comment, Enforcement of No-Strike Clauses in State Courts, 1963 U. ILL. L. F. 495, 499
n.28 wherein a May 20, 1963, decision of the Cir. Ct. of Cook County is said to have enforced
an arbitrator's order that a strike in violation of a "no-strike" clause be discontinued. In Drake
Bakeries v. Local 150, American Bakery and Confectionary Workers, 370 U.S. 254, at 260
n.5 (1960), the United States Supreme Court noted the existence of the Ruppert rule without
evaluating its applicability in federal courts.
77 There is strong evidence that new legislation in this specific area is very unlikely in the
near future. See Aaron supra note 49, at 1030. See also Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reap-
praised, 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 292, 345 (1963) wherein the author suggests that the im-
mediate need is an amendment to § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act to allow courts to issue
injunctions in the type of case under discussion. Cf. Leedom, supra note 66.
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against both employers and unions? There are some who suggest that this
question is not for the courts to answer."5 However, in the absence of appro-
priate legislation, they must make the necessary value judgments.7 " Labor
organizations long ago discarded their swaddling clothes. If judicial enforce-
ment of their contractual undertakings not to strike is precluded by the inter-
play of the three federal statutes herein considered, then labor unions are being
overprotected. The use of injunctions in such circumstances is not an abuse
at which § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was aimed."0 The holding in American
Dredging facilitates the settlement of labor disputes in a manner which mini-
mizes the likelihood of violence and economic waste, a paramount public interest
that should be reflected in any national labor policy. The toll of modem strikes
can be extremely heavy, not only for management, but for unions and for the
public as well.81 As one commentator has adroitly observed: "The strike carries
with it the dangers inherent in the old and abandoned practice of bloodletting.
Enough of it and the patient will surely die.... In labor disputes, as in inter-
national tensions, there is merit in any device that will keep the belligerents talking
while the wheels of industry keep turning." 2
Paul J. Meyer
FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - RETENTION OF "POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT"
UNDER § 2036 - CONTINUED RESMENCE IN TRANSFERRED HoME DOES NOT
REQUIRE INCLUSION IN GROSS ESTATE AS A MATTER OF LAW. - Plaintiffs sued
to recover refunds of estate taxes paid to the Internal Revenue Service, alleging
that the Commissioner erroneously and illegally included in their respective gross
estates property which had been previously transferred by the decedents to their
78 See Wellington and Albert, Statutory Interpretation and the Political Process: A Com-
ment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1566 (1963).
79 Moreover, considering the ramifications of a decision on the question of the removability
of a suit to enjoin a strike in breach of contract, see text accompanying notes 61-65 supra, the
courts must carefully weigh policy considerations, which under the circumstances, should
govern over such hypertechnical arguments as those regarding the meaning of "jurisdiction.'
In adjudicating the issue of removal, even arguments as to congressional intent are pointless;
for Congress did not envision the problem when it enacted § 301. See Gregory, The Law of the
Collective Agreement, 57 Micir. L. REv. 635, 637 (1959); Cf. Aaron, The Labor Injunction
Reappraised, supra note 77 at 333, 342 (1963); Kovarsky, Unfair Labor Practices, Individual
Rights and Section 301, 16 VAND. L. REv. 595, 606-07 '(1963).
80 The anti-njunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act were passed when labor
organizations were struggling for their very existence. The efficacy of the strike, their most
powerful weapon, was consistently thwarted by judicial intervention in the form of temporary
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, S. Doc. No. 7, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1951).
Lacking legislative or judicial standards and guided by their own economic prejudices, federal
judges, "in effect, wrote labor policy through ex parte orders." Stewart, supra note 38, at 676.
A major purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to prevent the improper use of injunctions
as strike breakers and to encourage the use of such non-judicial processes as arbitration for
the settlement of labor disputes. See discussion in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Toledo,
Peoria, & Western R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944). Norris-LaGuardia, therefore, was enacted at a
time when the best way to further industrial peace, an extremely important public interest,
was to protect labor's right to strike in all cases save where it led to violence. Today, both
effective arbitration and industrial peace would be better facilitated if injunctive relief were
available in § 301 suits.
81 The total cost of the 1959 steel strike has been reported as follows: workers, $1.75
billion in lost wages; industry, $1.5 billion; and the government, $1.6 billion. Leedom, supra
note 66, at 16.
82 Id. at 16, 17.
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wives.' In both instances, the husband continued to live in the house until his
death after deeding it as a gift to his wife. Defendant moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that the undisputed facts required inclusion of the
property in the gross estate of the decedent under § 2036 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.2 The United States District Courts for the Western District of
Tennessee and the Western District of Virginia, in denying the motions for
summary judgment, held: the undisputed fact that decedent continued to reside
in the house after transferring it to his wife is neither sufficient to infer an
agreement or prearrangement by the parties to that effect, nor does it, per se,
satisfy the "retention of possession or enjoyment" requirement of the statute.
Union Planters National Bank v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn.
1964); Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965).'
The first federal estate tax was enacted as part of the Revenue Act of 1916.,
Basically, its objective has been to tax the transmission of property at death.
However, estate planners have long recognized the efficacy of inter vivos property
transfers as potential tax avoidance devices.5 Tax advantages accrue to those
employing such transfers because:
Any gift [providing it is absolute and irrevocable] made by a client dur-
ing his lifetime will remove the gift property from his taxable estate at
the time of his death with a resultant saving of estate and inheritance taxes.
Inasmuch as the making of a gift will reduce the value of the client's
taxable estate, the effect will be to remove the gift property from his highest
applicable estate tax bracket with consequent maximum saving in estate
and inheritance taxes.
Hence, the use of inter vivos transfers normally results in maximum tax sav-
ings since the transfer is taxed under the lower gift tax rate rather than under
the estate tax.' To prevent the taxpayer from circumventing the estate tax,
while, at the same time, retaining an interest in the property transferred, "Con-
gress has surrounded the primary tax upon transfers by will and intestacy with
1 It is the taxpayer's burden to prove that the Commissioner's deficiency assessment against
the estate was unreasonable. See Estate of McNichol, 29 T.C. 1179 '(1958).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036: TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED LIFE ESTATES.
(A) General Rule - The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all
property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consider-
ation in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained
for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for
any period which does not in fact end before his death -
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property ....
3 It is to be noted that the only result to date in Stephenson has been a denial of the
Government's motion for summary judgment. This is not made particularly clear by the court's
opinion. In Union Planters, the jury did not find the necessary implied agreement to sustain
the inclusion of the property in the gross estate.
4 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 1-901, 39 Stat. 765. According to § 202(B), the
value of a decedent's gross estate included "a transfer ... intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at or after his death." Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202(B), 39 Stat. 777-78.
5 See Markovits, The Fate of Inter Vivos Transfers Under Internal Revenue Code
Section 2036, 7 THE TAX COUNSELOR'S Q. 395 (1963).
6 BARTON, ESTATE PLANNING UNDER THE 1954 CODE § 10.08, at 115 (1959) ; see gener-
ally §§ 10.01-10.10.
7 BARTON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 10.09 at 116.
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a periphery of protective taxes upon inter vivos transfers, which might otherwise
be utilized to avoid the tax."'
The judicial development of § 2036 indicates a significant lack of con-
sistency in its application.9 The ad hoc approach in interpreting this section
has seriously handicapped estate planners in their quest for certainty and pre-
dictability.1 0 The original enactment of the federal estate tax embodied "a trans-
fer... intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death."'
It was virtually an accepted fact that this wording was to be interpreted as in-
cluding transfers with retained life estates.' However, in 1930, the Supreme
Court dealt a serious blow to the future of the estate tax when it held, in May
v. Heiner," that a grantor's retention of the use and income from property
transferred to a trust did not require an inclusion of the property in his gross
estate. The belief that the Court would limit this decision to "secondary life
estates"' 4 was dispelled a year later when the Court handed down three per
curiam decisions which extended May v. Heiner to "primary" life estates re-
served by the grantor." Congress quickly responded to remedy the potentially
disastrous effect these decisions would have on revenues to be derived from the
estate tax by enacting the Joint Resolution of March 3, 193116 (the predecessor
of § 2036) which closed the obvious tax avoidance device. Two minor changes,
attempting to clarify the joint resolution, appeared in the Revenue Act of 1932."
Since then, no significant changes have been made in the substance of § 2036.
The confusion presently begirding this area has been, to a large extent,
caused by the lack of specificity of the statute. One author has suggested that
the tests of taxability "could have been made specific as applied to certain com-
mon fact situations."'" The problem areas have centered around the interpre-
tation of the words "retained," "possession," "enjoyment," and "right to the in-
come" which appear in the statute. 9 The Commissioner's attempt, in the princi-
pal cases, to include the transferred property in the gross estate on the sole basis
of continued residence therein represents another stride in his quest to broaden
the interpretation of § 2036.20
Until 1949, taxpayers enjoyed moderate success in their attempts to up-
set deficiencies under the predecessor of Section 2036, in situations where
8 LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiIr TAxEs 15 (1st ed. 1956).
9 Compare Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Smith, 241 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1957) with
State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
10 Comment, 60 Mica. L. Rnv. 631, 636 (1962). See Zissman, Problem Areas in The
Estate Tax, 41 TAXEs 875 (1963).
11 Statute cited note 4 supra.
12 See 74 CONG. Rnc. 7198 (1931) (remarks of Representative Hawley); cf. Nichols v.
Coolidge, 274 U.S. 531 (1927).
13 281 U.S. 238 (1930).
14 Markovits, supra note 5, at 396.
15 McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 783(1931); Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U.S. 782 (1931).
16 46 Stat. 1516 (1931).
17 Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 803, 47 Stat. 279. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1932). The committee reports do not indicate that Congress intended to
effect an application of the statute beyond life trusts.
18 Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of The Federal Estate Tax, 4 THE TAx
COUNSELOR'S Q. 121, n.1 (1960).
19 Statute cited note 2 supra.
20 Markovits, supra note 5, at 395.
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the Commissioner did not prove express retention. Courts, apparently,
were unwilling to find that there was an implicit agreement between the
parties, even though they may have been closely related individuals.2 1
The courts' recent tendencies to accept the Government's interpretation of
what constitutes "'retention of possession and enjoyment" forewarned estate
planners that the arguments propounded by the Commissioner in Union Planters
and Stephenson were in the offing. Specifically, in support of the motions for
summary judgment,22 the defendant alleged that the undisputed fact that the
decedent continued to live in the residence until his death compelled the court
to find that there existed an express or implied agreement between the grantor
and his wife retaining such a right in the grantor which made the residence
includible; or, in the alternative, that the continued residence by the grantor
until his death is a sufficient basis to include the transferred property in the gross
estate irrespective of whether an agreement to that effect must be inferred.2"
To bolster his contentions, the Commissioner relied almost exclusively on
four significant cases. 4 The first of these, Commissioner v. Estate of Church,25
may well be considered the point at which § 2036 began to expand beyond its
previously narrow confines. The Court did not restrict itself to the exigencies of
the factual situation presented, but "also enunciated a broad philosophy of
taxation under Section 2036... ."" Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority
and referring to the Court's prior decision in Helvering v. Hallock,7 stated:
[ .. A]n estate tax cannot be avoided by any trust transfer except by a
bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably,
and without possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his
possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property. After such
a transfer has been made, the settlor must be left with no present legal title
in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right
to possess or to enjoy the property then or thereafter. In other words such
a transfer must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaffected
by whether the grantor lives or dies. . . . "It thus sweeps into the gross
21 Markovits, supra note 5 at 400. See also Burrill v. Shaughnessy, 71 F. Supp. 99
(N.D.N.Y. 1947).
22 The Commissioner's desire to prevail as a matter of law is more readily appreciated
when one considers his evident lack of success with juries. This is exemplified by the in-
ordinate number of times juries have found for the taxpayer under § 2035--Gifts in Con-
templation of Death-in spite of the difficult burden on the taxpayer to overcome the statutory
presumption provided therein.
23 Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Va. 1965); Union Planters
National Bank v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883, 884 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
24 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949) ; Skinner's Estate v. United
States, 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963); Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 667
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 829 (1959); Harter v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax. R.
1964 (N.D. Okla. 1954). Brief for Defendant, pp. 8-16, Stephenson v. United States, 238
F. Supp. 660 "(W.D. Va. 1965); Brief for Defendant, pp. 9-17, Union Planters National Bank
v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964). The Commissioner used virtually the
same brief in both cases. Subsequent citations to the defendant's brief will refer to the pagina-
tion in the Stephenson brief. Several of the cases which will be discussed subsequently in this
article have arisen under the predecessors of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2036. For simplicity,
succeeding references will be to the present statutory provision.
25 335 U.S. 632 (1949). Decedent irrevocably transferred stocks to a trust but required
the trustee to pay him the income for life. Estate of Church now applies to post-1932 transfers.
26 Markovits, supra note 5, at 400-01.
27 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
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estate all property the ultimate possession or enjoyment of which is held
in suspense until the moment of the decedent's death or thereafter ...
Testamentary dispositions of an inter vivos nature cannot escape the force
of this section by hiding behind legal niceties contained in devices and
forms created by conveyancers."
25
In Harter v. United States,2" the court refused to agree with the taxpayer's
contention that the retained interest must be provided for in the instrument of
transfer or that the retained interest be one that could be enforced over the
objections of the transferee. In Estate of McNichol v. Commissioner,0 decedent
conveyed income-producing real property to his children. Contemporaneously,
he made an oral agreement with them retaining the right to the income from
the transferred properties for his lifetime. In upholding the Commissioner's ir.-
clusion of the properties in the decedent's gross estate, the court held that the
collection of rents by the decedent constituted a factual "enjoyment" of the
properties. "Enjoyment as used in the death tax statute is not a term of art, but
is synonymous with substantial present economic benefit."'" The court indicated
that its decision was not to be construed as extending beyond those factual situa-
tions where an agreement existed." Estate of McNichol significantly broadened
the scope of § 2036 when the court, in reference to Estate of Church, stated:
But as we read the decision its bite goes deeper; and the opinion con-
stitutes a sweeping and forthright declaration that technical concepts per-
taining to the law of conveyancing cannot be used as a shield against
the impact of death taxes when in fact possession or enjoyment of the
property by the transferor - and more particularly his enjoyment of the
income from the property - ceases only with his death.33
The Commissioner conceded that Estate of Church, Harter, and Estate of Mc-
Nichol were distinguishable upon their facts from Union Planters and Stephenson,
but at the same time, he urged that their principles were clearly apposite. He
acknowledged that these precedents were primarily concerned with retention
of a "right to the income from the property" and not the retention of "possession
or enjoyment" which constituted the basis for inclusion in Union Planters and
Stephenson.
3 4
In light of Estate of McNichol's broad interpretation of "possession or en-
joyment," it is not surprising to find the court in Skinner's Estate v. United
Statess take an additional step in the direction of an all-inclusive definition of
28 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 645-46 (1949).
29 48 Am. Fed. Tax. R. 1964 (N.D. Okla. 1954); accord, Jane S. Greene v. United
States, 237 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1956).
30 265 F.2d 667 '(3d Cir. 1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 829 (1959).
31 Id. at 671.
32 Id. at 671 n. 6.
33 Id. at 673.
34 Brief for Defendant, Comm'r of Int. Rev., pp. 8, 9, 12. The Commissioner has apparently
misinterpreted the basis for the decision in Estate of McNichol. Although the controlling fac-
tors are somewhat less than obvious, it does appear rather clear that the court found a "reten-
tion of enjoyment"; see, e.g., Covey, Section 2036-The New Problem Child of The Federal
Estate Tax, 4 THE COUNS-LO'S Q. 121, 127-32 (1960); 60 Mxcn. L. Rav. 660, 663-64
(1962).
35 316 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1963).
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§ 2036. The Third Circuit, fully aware "that to some degree at least it was
breaking new and perhaps dangerous ground . . ."" upheld an inference of a
secret prearrangement between the settlor and the trustee retaining the "en-
joyment" within the meaning of § 2036. The court displayed a willingness to
infer a prearrangement comparable to that in Estate of McNichol on the basis
of uninterrupted receipt of the income by the settlor plus a "scintilla of addi-
tional evidence."3 At the same time, the court did not fail to mention its aware-
ness of the burden this decision would place upon the taxpayer in avoiding the
inference of secret prearrangements when income had been received for life.
It should be noted that the decisions in both Estate of McNichol and
Skinner's Estate involved a retention of the "enjoyment" from income producing
properties. It is suggested that deciding Estate of McNichol and Skinner's
Estate on this basis rather than upon the retention of a "right to the income"
was not commensurate with the intent of Congress. The legislative history of
§ 2036 indicates that the language "possession and enjoyment" was to be limited
to nonincome producing property.8 In addition, despite the doubts expressed
in both cases as to the requirement that some prearrangement exist prior to a
finding of retention, neither court was willing to abandon this concept. Hence,
the Commissioner could present no case in support of his alternative contention
in Union Planters and Stephenson. 9
However, with respect to the evidence necessary to infer a prearrangement,
there are decisions that have apparently gone beyond the holding in Skinner's
Estate.4" A recent decision extended the scope of implied prearrangements to a
factual situation which parallels Union Planters and Stephenson. The jury
in Peck v. United States4 found an implied agreement, retaining the grantor's
right to continue to live on the property, between the grantor and grantee
(mother and son) on the basis of the mother's continued residence in the house.
This appears to be the Commissioner's only success on this precise issue to date.
However, the very fact that this question was determined by the jury indicates
that this case does not support the defendant's contention in Union Planters and
Stephenson that the issue be summarily decided. Essentially, the holding in
Union Planters is that the determination of whether or not an agreement ex-
isted, which would be a sufficient basis to include the residence in the gross estate,
is a question for the trier of fact.
The Stephenson decision noted the distinctions between the cases submitted
as persuasive by the Commissioner and the fact situation in question: "In each
of the cases urged by the government.., there is a specific and tangible retained
benefit-income from the transferred property, either real or personal. In each of
the government's cases the courts found agreements relating to retention, either
36 Id. at 520.
37 1962 Wis. L. REv. 708, 711.
38 See H.R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1949).
39 Brief for Defendant, supra note 24; accord, Clark v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 895
(D. Colo. 1962); Estate of Bullock, 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1080 (1960).
40 See Fitzsimmons v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Wash. 1963); Estate of
Tomec, 40 T.C. 134 (1963).
41 CCH 1965 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (65-2 U.S. Tax Cas.) I 12,333 '(M.D. Ga. May 4,
1965).
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implied, inferred or apparent."4 2 A much closer factual relation was found
to those cases the plaintiff urged in support of his position.43 Both Estate of Burr"
and Estate of Weir" involved transfers of houses from husband to wife and con-
tinued residence by the husband. Neither case held that the decedent had re-
tained an interest in the property. The court conceded that two of the cases
supporting the plaintiff are ".. . somewhat blunted by the chronologically sub-
sequent decisions in Church and the cases following it."" However, Judge
Michie went on to say: ". . . [A]s I have already noted, these opinions [the
Government's supporting cases] do not deal with the situation presented to me.
Burr is much closer to the facts here than any of the cases cited in favor of the
government."4 7
It is submitted that the case development in this area indicates that the
Commissioner will not cease his endeavors to broaden the purview of § 2036
until virtually every transfer, including those in which the benefits derived by the
transferor are obviously incidental, is subject to the estate tax. The merit of the
Government's position must be seriously questioned when one considers how
frequently estate planners have employed the type of transaction which was
involved in Union Planters and Stephenson and the fact that there are no cases
that have included the property in the gross estate on the basis of continued
residence per se.4"
The application of § 2036 to the circumstances in Union Planters and
Stephenson raises the very serious question of whether gifts can be effected where
there is any subsequent enjoyment of the gift property. There are a number of
valid objectives which inspire people to make gifts. 9 This type of transaction
has traditionally been used to protect the grantees (usually wife and children)
from financial loss resulting from the grantor's business ventures. Justice Reed,
dissenting in Estate of Church, stated:
Legislation indicates a purpose to promote gifts as a desirable means for
early distribution of property benefits. In reliance upon a long-settled
course of legislative and judicial construction, donors have made property
arrangements that should not now be upset summarily with no stronger
42 Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660, 667 (W.D. Va. 1965).
43 Estate of Weir, 17 T.O. 409 (1951); Estate of Burr, 4 GCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054
(1945); Estate of Scheide, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1271 (1947) (the value of gifts to grantor's
wife not included in decedent's gross estate where wife used income to pay household ex-
penses); cf. Estate of Flynn, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1287 (1944) (no retention of "possession
or enjoyment" where the grantee (donor's wife) deposited the income from the transferred
property in a joint bank account to which the grantor had access); Estate of E. L. Green, 4
C0H Tax Ct. Mem. 286 (1945) (the fact that some of the income from the transferred
property was used to support transferor does not prove that grantor reserved the income for
life); Estate of Sessoms, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1056 (1949) (the possibility that some of the
income might be used by the grantee (wife) for herself or as guardian for the children, does
not justify the inclusion of such a trust in the decedent's estate).
44 4 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1054 (1945).
45 17 T.C. 409 (1951).
46 Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660, 666 (W.D. Va. 1965).
47 Ibid.
48 One author, discussing Burr, which the court found analogous to the situation at bar,
stated: "The case is cited here only as an example of the lengths to which the Treasury will
go." MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAxES-ESTATEs, TRuSTS AND GIFTS 549 (1951-52).
49 See generally BARTON, op. cit. supra note 6 § 10.02 at 107-08.
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reasons for doing so than that former courts and the Congress did not
interpret the legislation in the same way as this Court now does.50
Several auxiliary questions would arise as a result of sustaining the Com-
missioner's inclusions in Union Planters and Stephenson. For example, it is quite
probable that a husband will, in some way, "enjoy" the gifts he has made to his
wife. Namely, the furniture in the home, the family automobile and even gifts of
jewelry and furs that the husband gives his wife are likely to be "enjoyed" by
the husband. 1 How far would the concept of "retained enjoyment" be extended?
It is submitted that the problem, which is essentially one of statutory in-
terpretation, should be resolved by Congress. ". .. [C]lients who appreciate
the fact that Congress has seen fit to provide the estate tax game for their
amusement... would prefer it if the stakes were a little lower and the rules a
little clearer."52 It is suggested that Congress respond as it did to the Supreme
Court's ruling in May v. Heiner. Then, the threatened loss of revenue inspired
legislative intervention. Now, the preservation of the dignity and stability of the
tax system should be an equally strong motivation. Rule-making by judicial
interpretation has its limits; such rules tend to be confined to the exigencies of
the particular case. Frequently the effect is to confuse rather than to clarify.
The burden now rests on Congress.
JOSEPH P. MARTORI
TORTS - APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK
GREATLY LIMITED IN MICHIGAN. - Plaintiff and defendant were hunting ducks
from a small, flat-bottomed boat. The boat was surrounded on three sides by
cattails. The plaintiff and defendant, who often hunted from the same location,
customarily stood in order to better fire over the cattails. While standing in the
boat, defendant aimed at a duck which veered to his right just as he was ready
to fire. As he fired, defendant fell out of the boat, his second shot striking the
plaintiff in the left leg which was subsequently amputated. The trial judge
refused defendant's request to charge the jury as to assumption of risk. On
appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held: the doctrine of assumption of risk
is applicable only to cases in which an employment relationship exists between
the parties, and to cases where there has been an express contractual assumption
of risk. Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965).
The doctrine of assumption of risk emerged at common law in master-
servant cases, with Priestley v. Fowler1 providing the greatest impetus to its devel-
opment.2 The doctrine emerged with a dual nature. In one sense, it was used
to deny recovery to an employee injured by a hazard inherent in his work when
50 Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 652-53 (1949).
51 Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 15-16, Stephenson v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 660 '(W.D.
Va. 1965); Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 6-7, Union Planters National Bank v. United States, 238 F.
Supp. 883 (W.D. Tenn. 1964).
52 Zissman, Problem Areas in The Estate Tax, 41 TAxEs 875 (1963).
1 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1838).
2 PRossaa, ToRTs 450 n.3 (3d ed. 1964).
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the employer had in no way been negligent in the duty owed his employee. In
this sense, the phrase "assumption of risk" was used simply to convey the idea
that the employer was not at fault and therefore not liable. In its second sense,
it was used when the employer had breached the duty of care he owed his
employee. The employer escaped liability because the employee, with notice
of such negligence, "assumed the risk" by accepting it or continuing the em-
ployment.' Eventually, the doctrine was extended to other types of negligence
cases.4 Ample authority that this broader usage of the doctrine is proper may be
found.5 Bohlen's statement, reflecting the typical view, is: ". . . [t]he prin-
ciple that one who has voluntarily encountered a known danger cannot recover
from the creator thereof . . . [is not limited to cases] . . . brought by
workmen against their employers.... It is not in any way founded upon any-
thing peculiar to the relation of master and servant.... ." A general statement
of the modem doctrine is: "a plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm
arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover
for such harm."'
The doctrine first appeared in Michigan in Michigan Central R. R. v. Leahey,
which relied heavily on early English and American cases. All of the cases in-
volved attempts by a servant to hold his master liable for injuries allegedly
attributable to the negligence of a fellow servant. The court, in Feigner, con-
cluded: "From a consideration of the authorities cited [in the Leahey case] it is
evident that the doctrine of assumption of risk as first promulgated in Michigan
was a doctrine for use only in cases involving the master-servant relationship."'
The court continued: "While continuing to apply the doctrine properly to cases
arising from the employment relationship... regrettably this Court subsequently
failed to restrict its use only to such cases."'"
Three other uses of the doctrine to which the term was incorrectly extended
are: as a virtual synonym of contributory negligence;" in place of stating the
defendant was never negligent; 2 and to enlarge a law violator's duty, particu-
larly when he was the defendant." The court, in Feigner, recognized that the
3 See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast L. R.R., 318 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1943); Meistrich v.
Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 31 N.J. 44, 49-50, 155 A.2d 90, 93 (1959).
4 See, e.g., Miner v. Conn. River R.R., 153 Mass. 398, 26 N.E. 994 (1891); Campion
v. Chicago Landscape Co., 295 Ill. App. 235, 14 N.E.2d 879 (1938). The Massachusetts
court, in Miner, stated: "Independently of any relation of master and servant there may be a
voluntary assumpton- of the risk of a known danger, which will debar one from recovering
compensation in case of injury to person or property therefrom, even though he was in the ek-
ercise of due care." 153 Mass. at 402-03, 26 N.E. at 995.
5 E.g., Columbia Amusement Co. v. Rye, 288 Ky. 179, 184, 155 S.W.2d 727, 729 (1941);
Fay v. Thrasher, 77 Ohio App. 179, 186, 66 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1946); Hunn v. Windsor Hotel
Co., 119 W.Va. 215, 218, 193 S.E. 57, 58 (1937).
6 Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk, 20 Hnv. L. Rav. 14 (1906).
7 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS § 496(a) (1965).
8 10 Mich. 193 (1861).
9 FeIgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 39, 133 N.W.2d 136, 145 (1965).
10 Ibid.
11 E.g., Hemington v. Hemington, 221 Mich. 206, 190 N.W. 683 (1922); Cook v. John-
son, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N.W. 388 (1885).
12 E.g., Schnepf v. Andrews, 333 Mich. 509, 53 N.W.2d 355 (1952); Heller v. Chicago
.KR., 109 Mich. 53, 66 N.W. 667 (1896).
13 E.g., Samuelson v. Olson Trans. Co., 324 Mich. 278, 36 N.W.2d 917 (1949); Winckow-
ski v. Dodge, 183 Mich. 303, 149 N.W. 1061 (1914).
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doctrine of assumption of risk had been applied to cases other than employment
cases "without valid precedential authority for doing so,"14 and said, in regard
to the three above misapplications of the term: "[T]he traditional concepts of
contributory negligence are more than ample to present that affirmative defense
to establish negligent acts."'" Further, when the term is used in place of stating
the defendant was never negligent, "[C]learly, the doctrine of assumption of
risk has no utility in such context, nor do we presume that our judicial prede-
cessors intended by the use of the language 'assumed the risk,' to suggest that the
doctrine of assumed risk was being applied .. ."16 "Language other than that
of assumption of risk easily can be found to describe the enlarged scope of the
duty of due care imposed upon one who voluntarily violates statutory or common
law standards of due care."' 7 The Michigan Supreme Court, feeling that use
of the term in the above three situations was not based on precedent and "add[ed]
nothing to modem law except confusion""' greatly limited future use of the
doctrine by declaring it valid only in cases involving employment relationships
or cases where there has been an express contractual assumption of risk.'9
The Michigan court's emasculation of the doctrine adds to the mounting
criticism surrounding the assumption of risk doctrine. Critics of the doctrine
feel that less confusing, more accurate, and hence more equitable decisions would
result if the problem areas often disposed of under assumption of risk were con-
sidered instead under the concepts of duty and contributory negligence. The
doctrine, its critics claim, "serves no purpose which is not fully taken care of
by the other doctrines; that it adds only duplication leading to confusion; and
that it results in some denial of recovery in cases where it should not be denied."2 °
Is the critics' claim that part of the cases now disposed of under assumption
of risk should be distributed to the concept of contributory negligence valid?
The proponents of this distribution point out that "[C]ontributory negligence
may consist not only in a failure to discover or appreciate a risk which would
be apparent to a reasonable man, or an inadvertent mistake in dealing with it,
but also in an intentional exposure to a danger of which the plaintiff is aware."'"
Thus, when a defendant has violated his duty to a plaintiff, and the plaintiff,
aware of the defendant's breach of duty, unreasonably chooses to expose himself
to the risk, he has merely been contributorily negligent.
Opponents of distributing a part of the doctrine of assumption of risk to
the concept of contributory negligence raise several objections. They note that
whether a plaintiff has assumed a risk depends on a subjective standard - the
plaintiff must appreciate the risk and voluntarily choose to encounter it - while
the question of whether a plaintiff has been contributorily negligent depends
14 FeIgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 45, 133 N.W.2d 136, 148 (1965).
15 Id. at 56, 133 N.W.2d at 154.
16 Id. at 43, 133 N.W.2d at 147.
17 Id. at 56, 133 N.W.2d at 154.
18 Id. at 46, n.7, 133 N.W.2d 136, 148 n.4 (citing James, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE
L.J. 141, 169 (1952)).
19 Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 133 N.W.2d 136 (1965).
20 PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 453 '(summarizes critics' arguments).
21 Id. at 434. See Chisenall v. Thompson, 363 Mo. 538, 252 S.W.2d 335 (1952); RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 466 (1965).
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on failure to meet an objective standard- that of the reasonable man."2 Pro-
ponents of distribution correctly answer, however, that while assumption of
risk depends on a subjective standard, those assumptions of risk which also fall
below the objective standard are contributorily negligent actions, and could
therefore be properly distributed to that concept." As for those assumptions
which do not fall below the objective standard, advocates of distribution treat
them under the second concept: the concept of duty.
Another objection made to partially treating assumption of risk under the
concept of contributory negligence is that while assumption of risk is a valid
and sufficient defense both where the defendant is strictly liable,24 and where
his conduct has been wilful, wanton or reckless,25 ordinary contributory neg-
ligence is not a defense where such conditions exist.2 " Proponents counter with
the argument that "plaintiff has deliberately subjected himself to the danger
created by defendant's reckless conduct. Plaintiff's conduct may be treated as
on the same level or plane as defendant's conduct and therefore a proper bar
on this basis."2' And, "[S]imilar reasoning can be applied to the case of strict
liability being imposed on the defendant... ,,28 Prosser, after declaring that
contributory negligence, consisting merely of inadvertence or carelessness, is not
a defense against strict liability, says:
At the same time, the defense which consists of voluntarily and unreason-
ably encountering a known danger, and in negligence cases passes more
or less indiscriminately under the names of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, will, in general, relieve the defendant of strict liability.
Here, as elsewhere, the plaintiff will not be heard to complain of a risk
which he has encountered voluntarily, or brought upon himself with full
knowledge and appreciation of the danger.... [t]he kind of contributory
negligence which consists of voluntary exposure to a known danger, and
so amounts to assumption of risk, is ordinarily a defense.2 9
The proponents of partial distribution of assumption of risk, so that con-
sideration of the problem area will, in part, be made under the concept of con-
tributory negligence, appears to be advocating a sound measure. Likewise, the
Michigan Supreme Court is on sound ground in agreeing with the advocates of
distribution:
[T]here is no need to engraft concepts of assumption of risk upon contribu-
tory negligence .... Assumption of risk should not again be used in this
22 See, e.g., Schrader v. Kriesel, 232 Minn. 238, 45 N.W.2d 395 (1950); Landrum v.
Roddy, 143 Neb. 934, 12 N.W.2d 82 (1943); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 454.
23 Wade, The Place of Assumption of Risk in the Law of Negligence, 22 LA. L. REv. 5,
12-13 (1961).
24 See, e.g., Arthur v. Merchants' Ice & Cold Storage Co., 173 Cal. 646, 161 P. 121
(1916); Cooper v. Portner Brewing Co., 112 Ga. 894, 38 S.E. 91 (1901).
25 See, e.g., Pierce v. Clemens, 113 Ind. App. 65, 46 N.E.2d 836 (1943); Evans v.
Holsinger, 242 Iowa 990, 48 N.W.2d 250 (1951).
26 See, e.g., Burke v. Fischer, 298 Ky. 157, 182 S.W.2d 638 (1944); Kasanovich v.
George, 348 Pa. 199, 34 A.2d 523 (1943).
27 Wade, supra note 23, at 13. See Brown v. Barber, 26 Tenn. App. 534, 174 S.W.2d 298(1943).
28 Wade, supra note 23, at 14. See generally HARPER & JAmES, TORTS § 22.7 (1956).
29 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 539.
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State as a substitute for, or as a supplement to, or as a corollary of, con-
tributory negligence.... [T]he traditional concepts of contributory negli-
gence are more than ample to present that affirmative defense to estab-
lish negligent acts.30
As noted above, those in favor of distributing assumption of risk do not feel
that every problem previously disposed of by utilization of the doctrine should
now be treated under the concept of contributory negligence. They do assert,
however, that those problems which cannot be distributed to contributory negli-
gence can and should be treated under the concept of duty. There are several
facets to this proposed utilization. The first is that assumption of risk is often used
where the true explanation of the defendant's nonliability is that he either had
no duty toward the plaintiff, or that he did not breach the duty he did have.3
No duty was breached because the defendant's conduct did not fall below the
law's requirement of conducting oneself so as not to cause unreasonable risks
of harm to others. Nonliability follows irrespective of any assumption of risk on
the part of the plaintiff. 2 An example of the "non-breach of duty" situation is
where a licensee-plaintiff has been harmed by an obviously dangerous condition
on the defendant's land. Here, because no duty has been breached, the defendant
will not be liable. 3 Note the underlying factors of such a decision and how
assumption of risk properly enters the case: it is not negligence to carry on an
activity if the utility outweighs the risk. 4 If the risk is obvious, it is reasonable
to expect the licensee to appreciate the risk and take steps to reduce it. The
reasonableness of this expectation reduces the risk, so that its creation is not
negligence. If a particular plaintiff should fall below the standard of the reason-
able man reacting to the risk, it does not make the defendant's conduct negli-
gent, for the plaintiff has fallen below the very standard on which the defendant's
conduct has been adjudged to be nonnegligent 5 In such cases, where the proba-
bility of informed choice enters to reduce the risk because of the reasonable
expectation that the plaintiff will guard against the risk, it is incorrect to "speak
of the plaintiff's having 'assumed the risk,' as if some independent legal principle,
distinct from the nonnegligence of the defendant, was operating to defeat
liability."3 6 The Michigan Supreme Court in Felgner, recognizing the correct-
ness of this argument, agreed that "[C]learly, the doctrine of assumption of risk
has no utility in such context. .... 37
There is a second aspect to the argument which calls for assumption of risk
to be partially distributed to the concept of duty. Here the defendant's breach
of duty is not considered independently of the plaintiff. Rather, the particular
plaintiff's reaction to the risk created by the defendant becomes the determining
30 Fegner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 50, 56, 133 N.W.2d 136, 150, 153-54 (1965).
31 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 28, at § 21.1.
32 Id. at § 16.1.
33 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Meissner, 102 Ind. App. 552, 200 N.E. 445(1936); Cook v. 177 Granite St., 95 N.L 397, 64 A.2d 327 (1949).
34 United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); PRossER, op. cit.
supra note 2, at 152; Terry, Negligence, 29 HARv. L. RIv. 40, 42-43 (1915).
35 See Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. Rav. 17, 19-20 (1961).
36 Id. at 19.
37 Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 43, 133 N.W.2d 136, 147 (1965).
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factor. Such is the case where the defendant's actions would constitute a breach
of duty to the one harmed by the breach except that the particular plaintiff in-
volved consented to the risk. Here, nonliability for a harm befalling one who
has consented to the risk is not a settled question."8 However, nonliability to
one who consents is certainly a respectable view held by many courts and writers."9
The attitude reflected in the field of intentional torts by the familiar principal
volenti non fit injuria - to one who is willing, no wrong is done - is also present
in the field of negligence. "Here, as elsewhere, the plaintiff win not be heard
to complain of a risk which he has encountered voluntarily, or brought upon
himself with full knowledge and appreciation of the danger."4
Accepting the view that nonliability should result when consent to the risk
has been given, the question arises as to how this conclusion should be expressed.
This is where the advocates of distribution enter. Rather than have this con-
clusion expressed by the doctrine of assumption of risk, they would express the
conclusion of nonliability by saying that the defendant has no duty to one who
fully appreciates the risk and voluntarily encounters it, or to one who objectively
manifests his awareness and willingness to incur the risk."' When the plaintiff's
consent occurs before the defendant's act and when the consent is known to the
defendant, he has been relieved of his duty to the plaintiff, and his subsequent
action is not unreasonable.
4 2
The proponents of distribution, however, do not limit their efforts to the
situation where the consent occurs before the defendant's act and so influences
the defendant. They also maintain that reasonable consent to a risk which
occurs after its creation, which would be negligence if not consented to, likewise
relieves the defendant of his duty to the plaintiff.4" The difference between the
situation where the proponents advocate distribution to the concept of con-
tributory negligence and this situation, where distribution to the concept of duty
is advocated, is that while the risk created by the defendant in each case is an
unreasonable one, in the former situation the consent to the risk was unreason-
able, while in the latter situation the consent to the risk is reasonable." A
reasonable act by the plaintiff will not constitute contributory negligence, and
so this type of an assumed risk is distributed to the concept of duty. The defen-
38 See R. Keeton, Assumption of Risk and the Landowner, 22 LA. L. REv. 108, 109
(1961); contra, PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 539.
39 See, e.g., White v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933); Gover v. Central Vt.
Ry., 96 Vt. 208, 118 Ad. 874 (1922); PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 538; Bohlen, supra
note 6, at 16-18.
40 PROSSER, op, cit. supra note 2, at 539.
41 Bohlen, supra note 6, at 16: "Where . .one voluntarily acts... his knowledge of the
risks inherent to his action .. .disproves the existence of any duty on the part of the creator
of the danger toremove it. . . ." "Voluntary subjection to a known risk negatives the existence
of any duty on the defendant's part by the breach of which he could be a wrongdoer." Id.
at 18.
42 R. Keeton, Assumption of Risks in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. Rav. 122, 163
(1961): "[clonsent to risk bears on the quality of defendant's conduct if the consent is com-
municated to the defendant prior to the occurrence of his conduct. If the proposition that as-
sumption of risk negates duty is limited to this situation, it is unobjectionable."
43 Ibid. (stating opponent's theory).
44 The voluntary incurring of a known risk can, of course, be reasonable. See, e.g., White
v. McVicker, 216 Iowa 90, 246 N.W. 385 (1933); Gover v. Central Vt. Ry. Co., 96 Vt. 208,
118 Ad. 874 (1922).
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dant is said to have no duty when the risk has been reasonably incurred, and
thus there is no liability.45
The objection to this is that nonliability is expressed by saying there is no
duty. The effect is to greatly limit the concept of duty. When the defendant
has acted without knowing there would be consent, he has been unreasonable
in creating the risk. The unreasonable nature of his act is not changed when
the plaintiff subsequently consents. The true explanation of defendant's non-
liability is the plaintiff's participation in causing the harm. To say in this situation
that defendant simply had no duty greatly limits the concept of duty as it is
presently used. The test of duty will no longer be whether the conduct of the
defendant was such that unreasonable risk was created, but will also depend on
what the plaintiff did subsequently.4"
Distributing the "subsequent consent to risk" situation, formerly treated
under the assumption of risk doctrine, to the concept of duty will also necessitate
a major procedural change in the law. The burden of providing that assumption
of the risk occurred will shift from the defendant to the plaintiff. Based on our
present concept of duty, such a change is unjust. Under this concept, the plain-
tiff's burden of proving a breach of duty has always been satisfied by showing
that the defendant's conduct was such that an unreasonable risk had been cre-
ated; and if the defendant wished to defend himself by pointing out that the
plaintiff had subsequently assumed the risk, he was obliged to raise this as an
affirmative defense." Perhaps the inequity of causing such a shift in the burden
is more clearly brought into perspective by comparing the situation with that
where assumption of risk was distributed to the concept of contributory negli-
gence. In both instances, the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. In both
situations, the plaintiff's assumption of the unreasonable risk occurred after
the risk was created. The difference is that in the case of contributory negligence,
incurring the risk was unreasonable; in the case where the doctrine is distributed
to the concept of duty, incurring the risk was reasonable (which, because it
could not be foreseen at the time of the defendant's creation of the risk, made
the defendant's creation of the risk unreasonable and, of course, could not
therefore make the creation of the risk reasonable when the consent did occur).
In both situations, then, creation of the risk was unreasonable and nonliability
ensued only because of plaintiff's subsequent participation. In the case of the
affirmative defense of contributory negligence, most states place the burden of
proof on the defendant,4" and advocates of distribution are properly con-
tent to let the distributed doctrine be an affirmative defense; but in the
case where the doctrine cannot be distributed to the concept of contributory
negligence only because the plaintiff's participation is not negligent, they are
45 Implicit, of course, in the entire discussion of "assuming risks" is that the assumption is
a voluntary one. An assumption of risk made to protect a legal right or to avert harm is not
considered voluntary and thus a defendant would not be relieved of the liability of his un-
reasonable creation of the risk when the assumption of risk was for this purpose.
46 See Keeton, supra note 42, at 160-66.
47 See, e.g., Frederick v. Goff, 251 Iowa 290, 100 N.W.2d 624 (1960); Goldberg v. Nor-
ton Co., 335 Mass. 605, 141 N.W.2d 377 (1957).
48 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 28, at § 22.11; PROSSER, Op. cit. supra note 2,
at 426.
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willing to have the affirmative defense of assumption of risk be assimilated into
the concept of duty. This unjustly changes the nature of the law. It is submitted
that the Michigan Supreme Court's changing of this particular facet of the
assumption of risk problem is an unwise alteration.
While the court greatly limited the doctrine, it was allowed to survive in
cases where an employment relationship exists between the parties, and where
there has been an express contractual assumption of risk. Considering the merits
of these exceptions, it appears that where there has been an express contractual
assumption of risk, the true basis of nonliability is that the courts are simply en-
forcing a valid contract. To treat the situation as though an independent and
distinct doctrine entitled "assumption of risk" were operating adds nothing and
could result in confusion and error.
The justification for allowing the doctrine to remain where an employment
relationship exists between the parties is that it merely follows precedent. How-
ever, one of the same objections applicable to the general use of the doctrine is
also applicable here. That objection is that the doctrine is utilized where the
true basis of nonliability is that the defendant never breached his duty of care.
The cases forming the early common law of Michigan used the term "assumed
the risk" to indicate that the employee "assume[d] the natural and ordinary
risks incident to [his employment]. . . ."" Clearly this is but another manner
of stating that the defendant-employer had not breached his duty. It is sub-
mitted that this specific use of the language of assumption of risk in master-
servant cases should not be considered part of the formal doctrine of assumption
of risk, just as the Michigan court stated it was not a part of the formal doctrine
of assumption of risk in cases not involving a master-servant relationship."0
However, the court, in Feigner, stated that the doctrine first was used in just
such a "no-duty" situation,5 and then cited cases involving "no-duty" situa-
tions.2 It then approved use of the doctrine of assumption of risk in employment
cases based on this precedent. This would seem to indicate approval of having
the doctrine apply to "no-duty" situations - a situation where the court, in
referring to the general applicability of the doctrine, correctly stated that the
formal doctrine of assumption of risk had no utility.53
One other state has completely re-evaluated the doctrine of assumption of
risk. New Jersey has declared the doctrine to be ". . . banished from the scene." 4
Less sweeping attacks have been made by abolishing the doctrine in limited areas,
such as workmen's compensation acts.5 Statutes apportioning damages between
plaintiff and defendant have also resulted in the doctrine's elimination. 0 For
example, Wisconsin sought to apportion damages with a comparative negligence
statute,57 but this intent was frustrated by the doctrine of assumption of risk
49 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Leahey, 10 Mich. 193, 202 (1861).
50 See text accompanying notes 30 to 36 supra.
51 Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Leahey, 10 Mich. 193, 202 (1861).
52 Feigner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 37, 133 N.W.2d 136, 144 (1965).
53 FeIgner v. Anderson, 375 Mich. 23, 39, 133 N.W.2d 136, 147 (1965).
54 McGrath v. American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 274, 196 A.2d 238, 240-41 (1963)_
55 PROSSER, TORTS 461 (3d ed. 1964).
56 See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 '(1943); McConville v. State Farm:
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 113 N.W.2d 14 (1962).
57 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 331.045 (1958).
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because it is a complete defense to a negligence action. Wisconsin solved its
problem by declaring that in the automobile guest passenger case, the "guest's
assumption of risk ...is no longer a defense separate from contributory negli-
gence." 8 The Wisconsin court recognized that the doctrine includes the situation
where incurring the risk was not unreasonable, and that the assimilation of the
doctrine into contributory negligence destroys this facet of the doctrine.5 9 They
were willing to make this sacrifice only to preserve the value of the comparative
negligence statute.
The Wisconsin decision points out the one area in which this writer feels
that distribution of the doctrine is not to be recommended."0 This area covers the
situation where the plaintiff's assumption of risk is not unreasonable, is voluntary,
and occurs subsequent to the defendant's creation of the unreasonable risk. Here,
based on the limited concept of duty which would result if distribution of the doc-
trine were made to the concept of duty, the distinct and independent principle of
assumption of risk is required.
The doctrine has, however, been shown to be soundly eliminated when it
merely covers a true case of contributory negligence or a case in which the de-
fendant has not been negligent. The doctrine in these cases merely hides the true
basis on which the decision should rest, and in the confusion that is introduced,
only injustice is promoted. The Michigan court's decision in Feigner v. Anderson
recognizes that a "wisely pruned"'" doctrine of assumption of risk is desirable.
The court, however, has wielded the pruning shears too ruthlessly.
MICHAEL K. Coox
VENUE - MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT CASES AND THE NEW FEDERAL
VENUE PROVISION. - Plaintiff insurance company brought an action in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia to compel con-
tribution from defendants for one half of the amount paid by the plaintiff to settle
an automobile accident claim in the Virginia state courts. The plaintiff was a citi-
zen of New York and the defendants were citizens of Georgia and Virginia.' The
central issue was the propriety of venue under the newest provision of the
federal venue statutes: "A civil action on a tort claim arising out of the manu-
facture, assembly, repair, ownership, maintenance, use, or operation of an
automobile may be brought in the judicial district wherein the act or omission
complained of occurred."2 Defendants contended the action was improperly
58 McConville v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15 Wis.2d 374, 376, 113 N.W.2d 14, 16
(1962).
59 Id. at 377, 113 N.W.2d at 17.
60 This recommendation applies to those states without comparative negligence statutes.
61 R. Keeton, supra note 42, at 166.
1 Service was made on the defendants under the provisions of the Virginia statute provid-
ing for service upon nonresident motorists: VA. CODn ANN. § 8-67.1 (1957). The constitution-
ality of applying the provision to a defendant who was a resident of Virginia at the time the
cause of action arose but who subsequently became a nonresident was determined by the court
in its decision.
2 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (Supp. V, 1964).
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brought under this section since contribution was not a "tort claim" within
the meaning of the statute.' In a sound opinion which relied exclusively on
federal principles for its conclusion, the court held: venue was proper as the
contribution action was a "civil action on a tort claim" falling within the pur-
view of the section. North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 237 F. Supp. 187 (W.D.
Va. 1965).'
Section 1391 (f) was added to the federal venue statutes to settle a venue
problem of long standing: could a diversity action, arising out of a motor vehicle
accident in state X, be brought in the federal district court in state X embracing
the accident site, although neither the plaintiff nor the defendant resided there-
in?' Although the clear wording of § 1391 (a)' did not permit such venue, the
United States Supreme Court, in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., supplied the
basis for a doctrine which circumvented the statute and held such venue proper.
The Neirbo case held that the defendant Delaware corporation, in complying
with New York law by appointing an agent in the state for service of process,'
had waived the protection of the federal venue statute and could be sued in the
Southern District of New York although neither the plaintiff nor the defendant
resided in that district. The decision rested upon the proposition that venue
was a personal privilege which could be waived.' This was coupled with the
theory that the appointment of the agent was not limited to service in the state
courts but extended to service in the federal courts sitting in the state and thus
constituted an implied waiver of the federal venue statute. "
Subsequently, this concept of an implied waiver of the federal venue pro-
vision by compliance with state law requiring a nonresident to appoint an agent
3 The court quickly put aside the possibility of the action's being brought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a) (1958) as this was clearly not the judicial district wherein all the plaintiffs or all
the defendants resided; and it denied any chance of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (c) (1958)
by relying on the holding in Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962).
4 This case is one of three to date which have dealt with 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (Supp. V,
1964) and is the first to illustrate some of the possibilities of the provision. Seay v. Kaplan, 35
F.R.D. 118 (S.D. Iowa 1964), merely allowed application of the provision to a case begun be-
fore its passage and Smith v. Konsak, 230 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Pa. 1964), denied a motion to
dismiss for improper venue in the light of the new section. Neither decision entailed a note-
worthy interpretation of the provision.
5 Among the obvious advantages of such venue were: availability of service against the
defendant; the convenience of witnesses; less expense than bringing suit in the defendant's
state. These were over and above the reasons for desiring a federal forum in the first place.
6 "A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may,
except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs
or all defendants reside!" 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
7 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
8 N.Y. GEN. CoRs. LAW § 210 (1964) demanded that a nonresident corporation appoint
such an agent before it began doing business in the state.
9 Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 168 (1939) (citing Panama R.R. v. John-
son, 264 U.S. 375, 385 (1952)) : "By a long line of decisions, recently reaffirmed, it is settled
that such a provision merely confers on the defendant a personal privilege which he may assert,
or may waive, at his election, and does waive if, when sued in some other district, he enters a
general appearance before or without claiming his privilege." For a collection of recent cases,
see Brandt v. Olson, 179 F. Supp. 363, 371 (N.D. Iowa 1959). The later legislative declaration
of this is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1958).
10 Under the holding in Neirbo, the waiver extended to all the districts in the state and the
plaintiff was apparently free to choose among them. Whether, under the implied waiver fiction
as it developed in the motor vehicle accident cases, all the districts in the accident state were
open to the plaintiff is unclear. Apparently, the issue never arose since plaintiffs invariably chose
the district which encompassed the site of the accident. See cases cited note 11 infra.
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for service within the state was carried over to the question of the propriety of
venue in the accident state in a motor vehicle diversity case between parties
residing in states other than that in which the accident occurred. A long line
of district court opinions, relying on the Neirbo decision either directly or in-
directly, held that such venue was proper." These opinions reasoned that:
(1) by driving on the highways of the state, the defendant had appointed an
agent for service of process within the state under the applicable state nonresi-
dent motorist service statute; and (2) the appointment of such an agent is
a waiver of the federal venue provision. While these cases differed factually
from Neirbo because they concerned individuals rather than corporations and
involved an implicit rather than an express appointment of an agent, they
represented the majority view on the question until 1953."
In that year, the issue was directly presented to the United States Supreme
Court in Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R." Plaintiff Illinois corporation
brought suit in a Kentucky federal district court to recover for property dam-
age resulting from the alleged negligence of an Indiana resident while driving
in Kentucky. The defendant challenged the propriety of venue in Kentucky
as neither he nor the plaintiff was a resident of that district. The Court held
venue improper, saying:
The requirement of venue is specific and unambiguous; it is not one of
those vague principles which, in the interest of some overriding policy,
is to be given a "liberal" construction. . . . [T]o conclude . . . that the
motorist, who never consented to anything and whose consent is alto-
gether immaterial, has actually agreed to be sued and has thus waived
his federal venue rights is surely to move in the world of Alice in Won-
derland. The fact that a nonresident motorist who comes into Kentucky
can, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, be subjected to suit in the appropriate Kentucky state court has
nothing whatever to do with his rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) .'5
Although Olberding overruled the long line of decisions holding such venue
to be proper,'" Neirbo was distinguished on the grounds that it contained an
express appointment. While it was still possible for the defendant to expressly
11 E.g., Falter v. Southwest Wheel Co., 109 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Archambeau
v. Emerson, 108 F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Kostamo v. Brorby, 95 F. Supp. 806 (D.
Neb. 1951); Burnett v. Swenson, 95 F. Supp. 524 (W.D. Okla. 1951); Urso v. Scales, 90 F.
Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Stale v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945); Krueger v.
Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. S.C. 1943).
12 E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-1043 (1965); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.403 (Supp.
1961); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-67.1 (1950). These statutes were designed to give residents of the
state recourse in state courts for accidents caused by out-of-state motorists by providing that
the mere act of driving on the state highways and roads constituted an appointment of a state
official as the nonresident's agent for the service of process within the state. The constitution-
ality of these statutes was determined in Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). All states
and the District of Columbia, excepting Alaska, have had such statutes. For a collection of the
statutes of 48 states and the District of Columbia, see Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832
(N.D. Iowa 1947) and HAWAII REv. LAWS ch. 230 § 33 (Supp. 1963).
13 The minority view was represented by: McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir. 1953);
Martin v. Fischbach Trucking Co., 183 F.2d 53 (1st Cir. 1950); Walters v. Plyborn, 93 F.
Supp. 651 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
14 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
15 Id. at 340, 341.
16 Cases cited note 11 supra.
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waive venue objections, the plaintiff could no longer resort to the implied waiver
fiction previously afforded under the nonresident motorist statutes in such cases."
He was left with one of three courses if he wished to pursue his action: he could
sue in the federal district court in his own state;s he could sue in the federal
district court in the state of the defendant;' " or, he could sue in the state courts
where the accident occurred. Each of these alterinatives had its attendant diffi-
culties, the result being the severe impairment of the plaintiff's cause:
The first of these possibilities is ordinarily precluded by an inability to
obtain service on the defendant; normally, the second would subject the
plaintiff to additional expense and difficulty. In respect to the third
alternative, the federal court may be preferable for many reasons, such
as the uniform and relatively simpler procedure and less crowded court
calendars.
20
Further, the plaintiff was faced with the anomaly that if the action were brought
in the state court, the defendant would have the option of removing the suit
to the federal district court embracing the situs;21 yet, if the suit were initiated
there without the defendant's consent, venue would be improper. The net effect
was to hand the defendant a dilatory tactic if sued in the accident state.2" If
he were sued in the state court, he could petition for removal. If sued in the
federal district court therein, he could challenge venue.
Section 1391 (f) was the legislative solution to the plaintiff's problem;2" but
the extent of the resolution is not clear. The apparent congressional intent
was to restore pre-Olberding case law, permitting venue in the federal district
court in the accident state regardless of the defendant's intention.24 However,
it is difficult to state conclusively that this was the congressional intent since
the available legislative history pertains to an original and much broader form
of the bill that was passed. 5 There is no direct commentary on the final, amended
version. This leaves any statement as to legislative purpose open to question,
no matter how strong the evidence in any one direction.
The provision itself does not answer the question. It is drafted in such a
way as to permit judicial interpretation and application that may make it quite
distinctive. While the effect of the statute in many cases will be merely to codify
17 E.g., Heiss v. Nielsen, 132 F. Supp. 541 (D. Neb. 1955); Drapkin v. Keene, 128 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Weber v. Threlkel, 126 F. Supp. 98 (D. Wyo. 1954); Cooke v.
Ford Motor Co., 122 F. Supp. 644 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
18 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958).
19 Ibid.
20 Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 339, 342 (1953). A specific illustration of the first difficulty is
found in Drapkin v. Keene, 128 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b) (1958). Removal by the defendant is taken to be a waiver
of any objection to venue. Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 260 U.S. 653 (1923).
22 Keefe, Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38 VA. L. REV.
569 (1952).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (Supp. V, 1964).
24 "I assume it was drafted with a view to simplifying trial procedure in tort cases, such
as in the case of a motorist from Maine and one from Utah, for example, who might collide in
Florida. The bill passed by the Senate would settle the jurisdiction where the witnesses were
readily available." 109 CoNo. REc. 20829 (1963) (remarks of Senator Russell).
25 The original version was: "A civil action on a tort claim may be brought in thejudicial district wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." 109 CONG. Rac. 12154(1963).
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pre-Olberding law, 26 there is the possibility that the provision will be found to
be narrower in at least one respect. Under the implied waiver fiction and the
usage of the nonresident motorist statutes, the defendant need only have been
driving on the state roads, whether in an automobile, a truck, on a motorcycle,
a motorbike or similar vehicle. For some inexplicable reason, 7 § 1391(f) uses
the word, "automobile." The question, of course, will be whether the courts
will regard this in a generic sense, applying the provision to cases involving
motor vehicles in general, or whether the courts will take the word in its spe-
cific sense and restrict application to accident cases involving automobiles. While
the former conclusion would be in keeping with an intent to broaden venue,s
the fact that the Congress moved from a broader to a narrower form of the
bill lends credence to the conclusion that a more restrictive law was desired.
But if there is the possibility that the statute may be less applicable in this
one area than the previous case law, there is an even greater possibility that it
will be found to be more extensive in other areas. The words of the section
which can be interpreted to go beyond claims arising from the defendant's driving
of a motor vehicle on public roads -a necessary factor to the application of
the implied waiver fiction- may supply the basis for extending venue beyond
the factual situations of the pre-Olberding cases. By eliminating the need to
employ the implied waiver fiction, the mechanics of the state nonresident motor-
ist statutes and the analogy to the Neirbo case are now unnecessary to achieve
accident state venue. Thus, requirements of nonresident motorist statutes will
not be the limits of accident state venue in a diversity claim arising out of an
automobile accident. Where, for example, many of the nonresident motorist
statutes speak of operation on the "highways of the state" or employ similar
phrases and may not be applicable to operation solely on private roads or prop-
erty, § 1391(f) has no such limitation. Again, in contrast to the usage of the
nonresident motorist statutes, the present provision does not specify that the
defendant need be driving at all. It is conceivable, then, that a case involving
a defendant pedestrian whose negligence caused a plaintiff motorist to have an
accident would fall under the statute since "operation" is not restricted to the
defendant. Further, it may not be necessary that either plaintiff or defendant
be driving. One example would be the case of a guest in a car suing, not the
driver, but the owner. This would be true if the "act or omission complained
of" be taken not to be the owner's act of turning the car over to the driver-
which may not have taken place in the accident state -but the act of the
driver that caused the accident.
Under the new provision, it may be possible to obtain accident state venue
against a nonaccident state repairer or manufacturer who was in some way re-
26 Cases cited note 4 supra.
27 As pointed out, the lack of commentary clouds many aspects of the statute.
28 The addition of the proposed new subsection to section 1391 would promote a
simple and orderly administration of justice by permitting tort suits to be brought in
the place where the witnesses are ordinarily most conveniently available .... The in-
terest of justice would be best served by enlarging the present provisions of the venue
statute and permitting those who have a cause of action in tort to assert their claims
in the judicial district where the act or omission complained of occurred.
S. REP. No. 620, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1963).
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sponsible for the accident. This too will depend on a holding that the "act or
omission complained of" is that which immediately caused the accident-for
instance, the blowing out of a faulty tire -rather than a holding that it is
that act in a distant state which produced the faulty tire.
Though not as well drafted as it might have been, if the provision continues
to receive a liberal construction by the courts29 and if the problem of service
can be met, the possibility of obtaining venue in the federal district court in the
accident state for claims arising from motor vehicle accidents of every kind
should be greater than ever before."' A court which considers the fact that
Congress began work on this statute with an intention of broadening venue,"1
and which weighs the unclear reasons for withholding accident state venue
against the many obvious advantages it would have for plaintiffs and witnesses,
can be expected to interpret this statute with liberality.
The problem of service is more irksome. Under the Federal Rules," service
may be made either as provided by federal legislation or in accord with the law
of the state in which the federal court sits. In all the motor vehicle accident
cases cited in this discussion, service was made under the applicable state non-
resident motorist service statutes. If, as suggested, this new provision is to
permit venue in situations not falling under such service statutes, authorization
for service will have to be found under other laws. If such is not found, the
practical effect of the provision may be at best no greater than that of the implied
waiver fiction. But barring these difficulties, the statute should provide more
plaintiffs than ever before a more advantageous trial site and should "provide
the opportunity to spread throughout the district courts across the nation many
of the actions rising out of motor vehicle cases." 3
Frank P. Cihlar
29 North River Ins. Co. v. Davis, 237 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Va. 1965). While this is only
a single case, the court does take a broad approach and the decision may set the pattern for
future cases.
30 If there is one area in which the courts could most readily write of this provision with
a wide brush, it would be in holding "automobile" to be generic. The equity of the statute
would seem to demand such a conclusion.
31 S. REP. No. 620, supra note 28.
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (7).
33 H.R. REP. No. 385, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963).
